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Abstract
Despite procedural modifications and advanced technology instrumentation, instrument approach phase accidents continue to be an
issue in general aviation. This exploratory study details an analysis of instrument approach phase accidents that occurred between 2002
and 2012. Particular attention was focused on instrument proficiency check (IPC) currency for pilots involved in accidents during the
approach phase of flight. An analysis suggests that more than half of instrument approach accidents evaluated during this study happened
within three and half months of the last IPC. A leading cause of these accidents was failure to control the aircraft. Instrument training
issues and potential follow-on studies are addressed.
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On September 8, 2010, at approximately 0926 EDT, an aircraft on an instrument approach to Helena, Georgia, crashed,
killing the instrument-rated pilot and seriously injuring his passenger. Radar data indicated that after the aircraft was
established on a GPS final approach course, the pilot did not appear to level off at the minimum descent altitude (MDA) and
subsequently impacted the ground 2.74 miles short of the runway. Weather in the area at the time was reported as foggy with
low ceilings and visibility. During the ten-year period ending in August 2012, this was just one of 170 instrument flight rules
(IFR) approach-related accidents, highlighting the need for further investigation into trends and causal factors (ASI, 2012).
Introduction
In response to the wide variety of weather conditions and areas of concentrated air traffic, commercially certificated pilots
usually operate in an IFR environment. Such operations are monitored by an extensive air traffic control network that
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depends primarily upon ground-based radar, and aural and
data link communications. Despite such oversight, safe
flight progress is still the responsibility of certified
commercial pilots, who have been evaluated as proficient
in all aspects of aircraft operation. This is particularly true
during the descent and approach phases of flight conducted
in actual instrument conditions, where weather obscures
ground features. Under these circumstances, the skill level
of the pilot in command is critical to the safe conclusion of
the flight. Over the last two decades, evolving technology
and changes in flight procedures seem key to a dramatic
reduction in aviation accidents, particularly in the approach
phase (FAA, 2010). However, approach phase accidents
continue to be a concern, and further research is needed to
address causes and remediation. The current exploratory
study was conducted to better understand factors related to
instrument approach accidents and the proficiency levels of
instrument-rated general aviation (GA) pilots.
Literature Review
Instrument Flight Qualification
After initial qualification, Federal Aviation Regulations
direct that instrument-rated pilots must complete holding
procedures, six instrument approaches, and course inter-
ception and tracking within every six calendar months
(FAA, 2012a). If the six-month period after formal
certification expires without recurrent training in these
instrument procedures, the pilot must complete an instru-
ment proficiency check (IPC) to be recertified (unless
currency is attained within the six-month period following
the initial certification period). Although Part 121 airline
pilots and Part 135 operators perform frequent instrument
procedures during the course of monthly operations, many
instrument-rated GA pilots may fly infrequently and, when
they do fly, usually do so in a visual flight rules (VFR)
environment. As a result, when such pilots operate using
IFR procedures, especially in actual weather conditions,
they are not well prepared procedurally and are unable to
fly the close operational tolerances mandated in an
instrument approach phase. Additionally, pilots who
routinely fly instrument approaches, depending on
advanced instrumentation and autopilot systems, may
experience a deteriorated ability to manually control an
aircraft when encountering actual IFR conditions.
Fanjoy and Young (2005) conducted a study of 100
airline pilots using a Level C flight simulator and found that
experienced airline pilots who routinely fly automated
instrument procedures had great difficulty maintaining
acceptable airspeed, heading, and altitude tolerances when
manually controlling an aircraft on final approach. Also,
over half of the study participants reported a degradation
of their manual flight skills due to the regular use of
automated approach systems. Although this degradation
could have been mitigated by periodic ‘‘hands-on’’
practice, such practice may not be practical due to company
policies or infrequency of flight operations by a given pilot.
Flight Skill Degradation
Few empirical investigations specifically address flight
skill degradation of pilots. Mengelkoch, Adams, and Gainer
(1971) studied 33 non-pilot students, assigned to two groups,
to determine skill degradation after academic instruction and
training in a mock-up aircraft cockpit. One group completed
five evaluated training sessions in a flight simulator, while
the second group completed ten evaluated training sessions.
Both groups were evaluated again after four months. The
group with ten training sessions performed better than the
five training session group on this final evaluation. However,
findings suggest both groups experienced skill degradation,
and in particular, there seemed to be a greater loss of
procedural knowledge than loss of flight control motor skills.
Of the flight motor skills, altitude and airspeed control
seemed to show significant degradation for both groups over
the training interval.
Research by Childs, Spears, and Prophet (1983) supports
significant psychomotor and cognitive skill degradation
over time, if practice and reinforcement are irregular. Skill
degradation can be attributed to either forgetting or
confusing tasks that are required for safe flight. The results
of this study suggested that perceptual and cognitive cues
decay rapidly, while motor skills are retained significantly
longer. Hendricks, Goldsmith, and Johnson (2006) studied
flight performance data collected from airline pilots. One
group was evaluated six months after training and a second
group was evaluated after twelve months. Significant skill
decay was found for the group evaluated twelve months
after training, compared to those who were evaluated after
six months. This skill degradation was noted for both
frequently practiced maneuvers and less frequently prac-
ticed maneuvers, such as emergency procedures.
An empirical study by Ebbatson, Harris, Huddlestone,
and Sears (2010) investigated the relationship between
manual flying performance and recent flight experience of
airline pilots. Study pilots, who flew more often in the
previous week, showed less frequent pitch and yaw inputs
during approach maneuvers. This suggests that pilots who
have recent flight experience fly more smoothly. The
longer the period of time between manually flown
approaches, the poorer the pilot’s performance.
Gillen (2010) evaluated the basic instrument flight skills
of 30 certified Airline Transport Pilots (ATPs) and found
them to be significantly below FAA standards. The
evaluation took place in a Level D simulator, under the
conditions of failed automation. Researchers also noted that
the participant pilots perceived themselves proficient in
handling the aircraft under conditions of failed automation,
when questioned in a pretest survey. Study findings suggest
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that the participants were overconfident and not proficient
in manual instrument flight skills.
In a study by Sohn and Doane (2004), 52 pilots were asked
to complete three tasks that measured memory, recall, and
situational tasks. Their findings indicate that memory plays a
significant role in situational awareness. While a novice pilot’s
working memory can be overloaded, experienced pilots use
stored information, which assists in decreasing their workload.
These findings are consistent with previous studies that
suggest cognitive abilities are more important for skill retention
during initial training than practiced skills.
Causse, Dehais, and Pastor (2011) conducted an experi-
ment to predict flight simulator performance based on
personality traits. Twenty-four pilots were evaluated with
neuropsychological tests to determine their tendencies in low-
level executive functions of reasoning, inhibition, and
updating. Once these executive functions were evaluated,
the subjects’ decision making under conditions of adverse
weather were tested in a flight simulator. Findings suggested
linkage between executive function tendencies and aeronau-
tical decision making. For example, the executive function of
updating was correlated with flight performance. Flying is
a dynamic experience that requires memory functions to
process and update information to maintain situational
awareness. Another finding, focused on inhibition, revealed
that subjects who were assessed as impulsive tended to
inappropriately continue a landing in dangerous crosswinds.
In response, the researchers recommended that executive
functions should be evaluated during annual medical
examinations to identify potential flight safety concerns.
O’Hare (2006) conducted a study to identify the
perceptions of pilots who had accidents or incidents during
flight operations. A questionnaire was sent to every licensed
pilot with a current medical certificate in New Zealand. Over
1,000 respondents acknowledged they had been in an
accident or incident and answered further questions. The
questions pertained to factors that initiated the event, what
hindered action to prevent the event, and the extent of pilot
involvement in the evolving hazardous situation. The main
finding of the study was that accidents reflected higher levels
of cognitive disconnect of knowledge and strategy than did
incidents. Additionally, incidents were caused primarily by
events outside the pilot’s control.
Shorrock (2005) interviewed 28 experienced air traffic
controllers in London, UK. The point of the study was to
gain insight on how controller memory lapses can lead to an
operational incident. The second part of the study included
an analysis of incident reports. Results led researchers to
suggest errors could be attributed to lack of attention,
fixation on other duties, lack of practice, and work overload.
Skill Retention Theory
Fitts and Posner (1967) proposed that learning, skill, and
retention happen in three sequential stages: cognitive,
associative, and autonomous. Cognitive learning degrades
with lack of use, sometimes to the point of total skill
memory loss. When associative learning degrades, errors
occur. In the autonomous stage, a learner can still complete
the task if the information is internalized and not lost over
time.
Researchers suggest that closed looped task knowledge
will decay at a greater rate than open looped tasks (Farr,
1987). An example of an open looped task is controlling an
aircraft in straight and level flight, with the airplane
trimmed for minimal pilot input. An example of a closed
loop task is flying an instrument approach. That procedure
requires constant feedback from the instruments to be
performed precisely and safely.
Müller and Pilzecker developed the memory consolida-
tion theory 112 years ago. During that time, while testing
human subjects, they discovered that recall of learned
information might be interrupted by the learning of other
information immediately following the original learning.
Their findings indicated that new memories initially
persevere in a delicate state and consolidate over time.
Memory consolidation hypotheses are still used to guide
researchers studying the time-dependent interaction and
brain processes (McGaugh, 2000). During initial and
recurrent instrument flight training, several distinct blocks
of knowledge are mastered. In consideration of memory
consolidation theory, mastery of initial or previously
learned information can be interrupted.
Practicing or revisiting a learned skill can reduce skill
degradation. This spacing effect describes how the longer a
person waits to recall information, the more likely informa-
tion will be forgotten (Cepeda, Pashler, Vul, Wixted, &
Rohrer, 2006). Optimal spacing of recurrent training
depends on how long the information needs to be retained.
Research suggests that 10 to 20 percent of a retention
interval is an ideal time period for recurrent training (Rohrer
& Pashler, 2007). This theory and related research have
provided organizations and regulatory agencies with guide-
lines for appropriate retraining intervals.
Contemporary theories suggest that motor skill profi-
ciency is related to practicing an action. Improved motor
skill performance can happen over time if the practiced skill
repeatedly meets the demands of a given task. The
relationship between physical movement and the outcome
of action should be the focus for increasing levels of
proficiency (Newell, 1991). Motor skill learning is an active
process, interrelated with cognition (Gallahue & Cleland,
2003). As a pilot gains more flight experience, his/her motor
skills and cognitive functions are likely to improve.
Causes of Accidents in IFR Conditions
An FAA study (2012) evaluated 26 interviews from
pilots who declared an emergency, requested assistance, or
made a deviation while facing adverse weather conditions.
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Researchers also analyzed weather conditions at the
incident location in question. Their findings indicated
deficiencies in pilot education and training, when tasked
with deciphering weather information. The study recom-
mended that all pilots receive a designated number of
weather training sessions from a Certified Flight Instructor
(CFI). Researchers felt that a home study course would not
provide valid training, if used for that purpose.
Wiegmann et al. (2005) conducted an analysis of aircraft
accidents using the Human Factors Analysis and Classification
System (HFACS). That analysis focused on human error in
general aviation accidents. The researchers categorized errors
as decision, skill-based, and perceptual. Errors that led to the
largest segment of the investigated accidents were skill-based,
followed by decision and perception errors. In response,
researchers recommended more use of aircraft automation,
improved checklists, and workload management training to
mitigate the likelihood and nature of future accidents. It was
noted that problems with cost, feasibility, and acceptance are
potential roadblocks to implementation of accident mitigation
elements.
An FAA study (2010) further supported the categoriza-
tion of weather-related accidents as resulting from
perceptual, skill-based, and decision errors. Skill-based
errors are the hardest to understand because pilots who do
not survive cannot report on what happened, and pilots who
live often misrepresent their own abilities. Additionally,
pilots have a tendency to alter the facts associated with an
accident if they feel their testimony may cause a
repercussion or trigger punishment by authorities. FAA
researchers also found that instrument-rated pilots were
often prone to getting into weather conditions that were
beyond their limit. A tendency to be overconfident, in that
regard, was prevalent. Study findings suggest that there is a
common tendency in the decision-making process to elect
to fly into adverse weather instead of diverting around it.
The United States has over 300,000 general aviation
aircraft, making it the largest general aviation fleet in the
world. Approximately 80 percent of general aviation
accidents are caused by human error (Wiegmann &
Shappell, 2000). Over the past 10 years, 170 accidents
have occurred during instrument approaches (FAA, 2012b).
The purpose of the current study is to examine general
aviation accidents during instrument approach and identify
common themes, as well as any correlation between such
accidents and the interval after initial or recurring IPC.
Methodology
This study evaluated general aviation accident data from
the AOPA Air Safety Institute (ASI) database. This data-
filtered search was performed to investigate all fixed wing
aircraft accidents over the past ten years that occurred
during IFR approaches. The resulting database filter
identified 170 accident reports for analysis. This data was
further sorted to identify 31 accident reports with recorded
IPC dates. Those accident reports were analyzed to identify
correlations and common themes. The data collected from
individual accident reports included: NTSB report number,
year of accident, primary cause, engine type, type of
approach flown, total time of pilot flying, pilot flight time
in accident aircraft, date pilot was IFR rated, date of last
reported evaluation (IPC), aircraft type, weather condition,
and type of instrument display. Researchers used only
information from the official reports and did not attempt to
make personal conclusions on primary or secondary causes
of the accident.
Findings
A filtered search of the ASI database resulted in data
from 170 general aviation aircraft accidents over the last ten
years. Seven incomplete datasets were removed from the
ensuing analysis. The next step in the analysis was to
extract primary accident causes from the ASI database. For
the 163 accidents considered, the primary causes were:
failure to control (29.4%), failure to follow instrument
approach procedures (29.4%), flight below published
minimum (16.6%), inadequate airspeed (11.7%), spatial
disorientation (8%), controlled flight into terrain or water
(2.5%), failure to initiate missed (2.5%), and other causes
(3.1%). These percentages are graphically shown in
Figure 1. In some accident reports, secondary causes were
identified but not considered as part of the current study.
The study dataset was further filtered to identify
accidents with a listed IPC date to investigate potential
correlations between accident causes and time since last
IPC. Although limiting data to those accident pilots without
a listed IPC date may affect generalization of study results,
the researchers felt this data was still useful in providing
insight for follow-on studies. For the current analysis, 31
accidents were identified with listed IPC dates. Primary
accident causes associated with these accidents included:
failure to control (29.0%), flight below published mini-
mums (25.8%), inadequate airspeed (22.6%), failure to
follow instrument approach procedures (9.7%), spatial
disorientation (6.5%), failure to initiate missed approach
(3.2%), and other causes (3.2%). See Figure 2 for the
primary causes of the accident subset with a listed IPC date.
Primary Causes of Instrument Approach Accidents
1. Failure to control
2. Failure to follow instrument approach procedures
3. Flight below published minimums
4. Inadequate airspeed
5. Spatial disorientation
6. Controlled flight into terrain/water
7. Failure to initiate missed
8. Other
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Next, a graphical summary was created to better
understand when accidents typically occur after the IPC.
The data shows that most of the accidents in the targeted
subset occur within three and half months following IPC.
After this time period, the number of accidents begins to
decrease. The lower quartile of the chart, which represents
the 25th percentile, is 50 days. The upper quartile, or the
75th percentile, is 156 days. Relative frequency is shown by
the height of the bars. Skewness is . 0, which indicates a
positive skewed distribution and accidents were less likely
to happen later in the period after an IPC (see Figure 3).
Finally, researchers separated primary causes of instrument
approach accidents (with IPC noted) into intervals of time after
the last noted IPC. These intervals were 0–100, 101–200, 201–
300, and 301–500 days. The researcher extended the last
interval to 301–500 days because of the lengthy time period
over which the remaining few accidents occurred. Table 1
depicts the primary causes of accidents during those blocks of
time. Thirty-six percent of the accidents that occurred between
0–100 days after IPC listed flight below published minimums
as the primary cause. Other primary causes during this same
block of time included: inadequate airspeed (29%), failure to
control (21%), failure to initiate missed approach (7%), and
spatial disorientation (7%).
Regarding the time interval 101–200 days after IPC,
38% of accidents were caused by failure to maintain
control. Other causes in that interval were: flight below
published minimums (23%), failure to follow instrument
approach procedures (23%), spatial disorientation (8%),
and improper decision to abort a landing (8%).
In the time interval 201–300 days after IPC, one of the
accidents was caused by failure to control and the other by
inadequate airspeed. In the 301–500 day time interval, both
accidents were caused by inadequate airspeed. It should be
noted that 29 of the 31 accidents used in this sample were
conducted in instrument meteorological conditions. This
means there was not an external reference to the horizon,
which provides pilots with a natural attitude indication.
Figure 1. Primary causes of instrument approach accidents.
Figure 2. Primary causes of instrument approach accidents with noted IPC date.
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Primary Causes with Noted IPC
Discussion and Conclusions
Conventional wisdom within the aviation community is
that pilots who have not demonstrated proficiency in
instrument flight procedures for more than six months are
unsafe in instrument flight operations. Previous research
into skill degradation suggests that without regular
performance of complex tasks, procedural and motor skills
degrade over a fairly short time frame, and procedural
knowledge tends to decay more quickly than motor skills.
Current FAA regulations reflect such findings by mandat-
ing training if more than six months have elapsed without
instrument flight since the last IPC. The current regulations
do not mandate what training is required for IPCs.
However, there is a recommendation of one and one-half
hours of ground instruction and a two-hour flight.
The results of the current research suggest that more than
half of the instrument approach accidents in the target
dataset were caused by failure to control the aircraft or
failure to follow procedures. In addition, the number of
individuals in the subject dataset who had accidents after an
IPC seems to peak at 111 days after being signed off. Any
generalization of these findings is not possible, as the pilots
of many accident aircraft in the original 170 accident
dataset may have had an IPC that was not reported in the
accident findings. Also, the data addressing the recency or
number of instrument procedures completed by accident
pilots was not available in many of the reports.
Accidents in the dataset with listed IPC dates occurred
over a wide time interval. Literature seems to suggest that
primary accident causes would reflect procedural short-
comings or motor skill deficiencies. In the current study,
accidents that reflect procedural shortcomings (failure to
follow procedures, flight below minimums, failure to
initiate missed approach, improper abort decision) seem
to increase over the first 200 days following IPC. That
finding would agree with earlier research. The rate of
accident causes, which reflect motor skill aspects (failure to
control, inadequate airspeed, and spatial disorientation),
seem to remain fairly constant over the 200-day period after
IPC. That finding is consistent with limited ‘‘stick and
rudder’’ practice.
It is important to note the exploratory nature of this study
and the relatively small dataset considered. Additionally,
missing aspects of the original dataset relating to IPC dates
and actual instrument currency limit the utility of these
findings. However, findings do suggest interesting follow-
on studies with a larger and more detailed dataset to pin
Figure 3. Summary of days elapsed between instrument proficiency check and accident.
1. Failure to control
2. Flight below published minimums
3. Inadequate airspeed
4. Failure to follow instrument approach procedures
5. Spatial disorientation
6. Failure to initiate missed approach
7. Other
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down degradation aspects of instrument flight proficiency.
Findings from such studies should offer insight and
opportunities for mitigation strategies to improve aircraft
operations in an instrument environment, particularly for
the general aviation pilot population.
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Table 1.
Primary causes of accidents after IPC in time intervals.
0–100 Days (14 Accidents) 101–200 Days (13 Accidents) 201–300 Days (2 Accidents) 301–500 Days (2 Accidents)
Flight Below Published Minimums
36% (5)
Failure to Maintain Control 38% (5) Failure to Maintain Control
50% (1)
Inadequate Airspeed 100% (2)
Inadequate Airspeed 29% (4) Flight Below Published Minimums 23% (3) Inadequate Airspeed 50% (1) N/A
Failure to Maintain Control 21% (3) Failure to Follow Instrument Approach
Procedures 23% (3)
N/A N/A
Failure to Initiate Missed 7% (1) Improper Decision to Abort Landing 8% (1) N/A N/A
Spatial Disorientation 7% (1) Spatial Disorientation 8% (1) N/A N/A
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